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Abstract 
The classic narrative of economic development -- poor countries are caught in poverty 
traps, out of which they need a Big Push involving increased aid and investment, leading 
to a takeoff in per capita income -- has been very influential in development economics 
since the 1950s. This was the original justification for foreign aid. The narrative lost 
credibility for a while but has made a big comeback in the new millennium. Once again it 
is invoked as a rationale for large foreign aid programs. This paper applies very simple 
tests to the various elements of the narrative. Evidence to support the narrative is scarce. 
Poverty traps in the sense of zero growth for low income countries are rejected by the 
data in most time periods. There is evidence of divergence between rich and poor nations 
in the long run, but this does not imply zero growth for the poor countries. Moreover, this 
divergence is more associated with institutions rather than the disadvantages of initial 
income. The idea of the takeoff does not garner much support in the data. Takeoffs are 
rare in the data, most plausibly limited to the Asian success stories. Even then, the 
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The Big Push has returned to favor in the development policy-making community, after 
half a century of exile. Indeed, 2005 is shaping up as the Year of the Big Push. Part of the 
motivation is the international effort to meet the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
which are actually 18 targets for improvements in social and economic indicators in developing 
countries by the year 2015. The UN Millennium Project, commissioned by Kofi Annan to assess 
how to meet the Millennium Development Goals set for 2015, issued a large Report in January 
2005 that argued that poor countries were in a “poverty trap.” Escaping the trap requires: 
a big push of basic investments between now and 2015 in public administration, human capital 
(nutrition, health, education), and key infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports, water and sanitation, 
accessible land for affordable housing, environmental management).
2 
 
The Millennium Project recommends a series of technical interventions, such as planting 
nitrogen-fixing leguminous trees, distributing bed-nets to protect against malaria, giving fertilizer 
to farmers, building health clinics, constructing battery-charging stations, giving each village a 
truck and a truck repairman, etc. In an appendix to its report, the Millennium Project lists 449 
recommended interventions in all. 
Jeffrey Sachs echoed this in his 2005 book, The End of Poverty, when he said  
A combination of investments well attuned to local needs and conditions can enable African 
economies to break out of the poverty trap. These interventions need to be applied systematically, 
diligently, and jointly since they strongly reinforce one another. (p. 208) 
 
Sachs called upon developing countries to have an “Investment Plan, which shows the size, 
timing, and costs of the required investments” as well a “Financial Plan to fund the Investment 
Plan, including the calculation of the Millennium Development Goals Financing Gap, the portion 
of financial needs the donors will have to fill.” (p. 273).  
  Sachs envisions an administrative apparatus to implement the Plans: 
Each low income country should have the benefit of a united and effective United Nations country 
team, which coordinates in one place the work of the UN specialized agencies, the IMF, and the 
World Bank. In each country, the UN country team should be led by a single United Nations resident 
coordinator, who reports to the United Nations Development Program, who in turn reports to the UN 
secretary-general. (p. 285) 
 
                                                 
2 UN Millennium Project, Overview Report, 2005, p. 19  
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With these elements in place and adequate foreign aid, Sachs says that “success in ending the 
poverty trap will be much easier than it appears.” (p. 289) 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair likewise called at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos in January 2005 for “a big, big push forward” in Africa, featuring a big increase in foreign 
aid.
3 Prime Minister Blair commissioned a Report on Africa, which released its findings in March 
2005. Tony Blair had the Big Push in Africa at the top of the agenda of the G-8 summit meeting 
in July 2005. The report summarized its findings as: 
The actions proposed by the Commission constitute a coherent package for Africa. The problems they 
address are interlocking. They are vicious circles which reinforce one another. They must be tackled 
together. To do that Africa requires a comprehensive ‘big push’ on many fronts at once.
4 
  
  The World Bank and IMF issued a joint report on the Millennium Development Goals in 
April 2005, calling for “a big push in aid” They call upon developing countries and foreign aid 
donors to implement the Big Push as follows: 
 
For coherence and effectiveness, the scaling up of development efforts at the country level must be guided 
by country-owned and -led poverty reduction strategies (PRSs) or equivalent national development 
strategies. Framed against a long-term development vision, these strategies should set medium-term 
targets—tailored to country circumstances—for progress toward the MDGs and related development 
outcomes. And they should define clear national plans and priorities for achieving those targets, linking 
policy agendas to medium-term fiscal frameworks. Donors should use these strategies as the basis for 
aligning and harmonizing assistance. Official development assistance (ODA) must at least double in the 




Judging by recent statements, a Big Push involves a combination of (1) a big increase in foreign 
aid, (2) a simultaneous increase in investment in many different sectors, as well as a package of 
complementary policy changes and technical interventions, and (3) a national plan and 
administrative apparatus to direct the investments, technical interventions, and policy changes.  
Do “Big Pushes” work? Does economic development happen mainly through Big 
Pushes? There are three inter-related concepts that we can explore empirically: the Big Push, the 
Poverty Trap, and the Takeoff. In the traditional development narrative, which has recently 
regained favor, the least developed countries are caught in a Poverty Trap, from which they need 
                                                 
3 International Herald Tribune, Friday January 28, 2005, p. 1 
4 OUR COMMON INTEREST: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, March 2005, p. 13 
5 IMF and World Bank, 2005.  
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a Big Push involving increased aid and investment to emerge, after which they will have a 
Takeoff into self-sustained growth. What evidence is there for or against this narrative?  
Note that the three concepts are related in the standard narrative, but don’t have to be. 
One could find evidence for poverty traps, but not for takeoffs, or vice versa. One could accept 
poverty traps, but still not believe in a Big Push to be implemented by the aid agencies. Also the 
particular form of poverty trap here is restricted – it is one of stagnation, zero per capita growth, 
which does not rule out other possible poverty traps. The specificity of the classic development 
narrative makes it easier to test, and it is worth testing given its current popularity in policy 
debates. However, I don’t intend to push the conclusions beyond a judgment on whether the 
narrative holds.  
Intellectual history 
  Paul Rosenstein Rodan wrote the founding article of development economics in 1943, 
innocuously titled “Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-eastern Europe.” He called 
for large-scale externally-financed investment in Eastern European industry, which would not 
spontaneously emerge from the private sector because of external economies and 
complementarities between industries. His idea was widely adopted as applicable to the problems 
of all “Third World” economies and came to be known as the “Big Push.” 
  There are parallels between development economics of the 1940s and 1950s and the ideas 
of the Big Push current today. Then, as now, there were economists who advocated a “Big Push” 
to get countries out of a “poverty trap,” foreign aid to fill the “Financing Gap,” and action on all 
fronts through comprehensive “planning”.
6 The 1960 counterpart to Sachs’ 2005 The End of 
Poverty was Walt Rostow’s best-selling The Stages of Economic Growth, which argued that 
countries could emerge out of stagnation into self-sustained growth thanks to an aid-financed 
increase in investment. It was Rostow that popularized the term “takeoff.”  
                                                 
6 A related classic development model is the “two-gap model”, which stresses the role of aid to “fill the 
gap” between actual investment and the investment required to reach a target growth rate. Easterly (1999) 
showed how this model also continues to be influential and rejected its predictions.  
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To be sure, development economists at that time advocated far more state intervention in 
the poor economies than the advocates of the Big Push do now.  The previous generation would 
have been sympathetic to planning as an economic system, while today’s advocates of the Big 
Push are clearly in favor of a free market as an economic system. However, there is still a 
planning parallel, as today’s advocates argue that large-scale public action is needed to escape 
from a poverty trap that keeps poor countries from the benefits of a free market, and these public 
actions must be planned by someone at the center.  
Jeffrey Sachs in his new book The End of Poverty is a representative statement on the 
renewed attraction of the poverty trap story today. He has many ideas on how the poverty trap 
happens, which seems to be influencing the above policymakers. One that is familiar from both 
the old literature on poverty traps is that poor people do not save enough. 
A second element in the poverty trap is a nonconvexity in the production function. Sachs 
suggests there are increasing returns to capital at low initial capital per person. He gives the 
example of a road with half of the road paved and half impassable due to missing bridges or 
washed out sections. Repairing the impassable sections would double the length of road, but 
would much more than double the output from the road. “This is an example of a threshold effect, 
in which the capital stock becomes useful only when it meets a minimum standard.” (Sachs 
2005,p. 250) 
These two mechanisms have always been prominent in the development policy 
community because they seem to create a simple way to break the poverty trap – give foreign aid. 
According to Sachs, the role of foreign aid is to increase the capital stock enough to cross the 
threshold level (the Big Push): “if the foreign assistance is substantial enough, and lasts long 
enough, the capital stock rises sufficiently to lift households above subsistence… Growth 
becomes self-sustaining through household savings and public investments supported by taxation 
of households.” (Sachs 2005, p. 246) The last statement is the “take-off” hypothesis. 
The UN Millennium Project and Jeffrey Sachs argue that it is the poverty trap rather than bad 
government that explains poor growth of low income countries and the failure to make progress  
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towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Sachs says “the claim that Africa’s corruption 
is the basic source of the problem {the poverty trap} does not withstand practical experience or 
serious scrutiny.”
7 Likewise the Millennium Project says “Many reasonably well governed countries 
are too poor to make the investments to climb the first steps of the ladder.”
8 
The theory of poverty traps is quite appealing: there are many ways in which we could think 
that countries could be caught in traps. The new growth literature has set out a number of interesting 
poverty trap models over the past two decades. For example, the Lucas (1988) model could predict a 
poverty trap in which low average skills in the population could discourage new entrants to the labor 
force from getting skills, perpetuating a low skill trap. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) set out a 
formal model of the Rosenstein-Rodan poverty trap and Big Push.  Azariadis and Stachurski 2004 
have a survey of many theoretical models of poverty traps.  
Even if there is a poverty trap, it is not clear that a Big Push engineered by administrative 
planners will work. Another interesting bit of intellectual history for evaluating the Big Push is 
the debate about central planning versus markets in the mid 20
th century. F.A. Hayek was the 
leading critic of central planning.
9 He pointed out that planners at the top do not have enough 
information about the realities at the bottom to design the right interventions in the right place at 
the right time. In his pithy phrase, “the success of action in society depends on more particular 
facts than anyone can possibly know.”
10 The information problem is particularly severe in foreign 
aid, which gets little or no feedback from the voiceless poor on how to fix local problems or the 
costs and benefits of doing so. The vast diversity of circumstances in poor countries calls for 
more local knowledge than is usually available to Big Push planners.   
A related problem many have pointed out with plans is one of incentives.  In foreign aid 
and in many other planning situations, the planner is not accountable to the planned and so does 
not internalize the costs and benefits of action. To make things even worse, many different 
                                                 
7 Sachs 2005, p. 191 
8 UN Millennium Project 2005, p. 34. 
9 Hayek’s reputation is tainted somewhat by his extreme predictions that state intervention in democratic 
capitalist societies would lead inevitably to totalitarian socialism, a prediction that obviously did not come 
true. However, his sharp insights into the shortcomings of planning and the spontaneous emergence of 
markets should be judged independently for their intellectual contribution. 
10 quoted in Lee 2005  
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foreign aid donors are contributing to the Big Push, which further weakens the incentive of any 
one donor through the usual collective action problems.  Even if the planner has good incentives, 
plans can be decreed at the top, but must be implemented at the bottom. How to design principal-
agent contracts to give good incentives for aid agency officials and government civil servants to 
do the interventions right and get results for the poor? This problem is particularly severe in 
foreign aid, when the actions and outcomes at the bottom are often unobservable to the 
administrators at the top, and where corruption is a problem in the civil service of poor countries.  
Testing the poverty trap 
Kraay and Raddatz (2005) have recently tested directly whether the savings and 
increasing returns mechanisms hold in the data. They point out that saving would have to follow 
an S-curve to generate a poverty trap, first increasing little with income, then increasing steeply, 
then flattening out again. They reject the S-curve in the data on saving and per capita income. 
They also fail to find evidence of the technological non-convexities that also are necessary to 
create the poverty trap. They conclude there is little evidence for a poverty trap based on these 
mechanisms.
11 
We can check further on some of the intermediate steps in the Big Push. Sachs said that 
large aid increases would finance “…a ‘big push’ in public investments to produce a rapid “step” 
increase in Africa’s underlying productivity, both rural and urban.”
12 Over 1970-94, there is good 
data on public investment for 22 African countries. These countries’ governments spent $342 
billion on public investment.  The donors gave these same countries’ governments $187 billion in 
aid over this period.  Unfortunately, the corresponding “step” increase in productivity, measured 
as per capita growth over this period, was zero.   
Has aid had the growth effects that the poverty trap model would predict? Decades of 
research on aid and growth has failed to generate evidence for this prediction.
13 The big stylized 
facts certainly do not support the prediction that aid has big growth effects, helping countries to 
                                                 
11 Graham and Temple 2004 also use a calibrated model of multiple equilibria and find that only a small 
portion of the income gap between rich and poor can be explained by such a model. 
12 Sachs et al., 2003. 
13 Easterly 2003 summarizes some of this research.  
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escape from poverty traps: (1) growth is lower in aid-intensive countries than in developing 
countries that get little aid, (2) aid has risen over time as a percent of income in Africa, but 
Africa’s growth rate has fallen over time.  
More sophisticated testing that would control for selection effects and reverse causality 
fails to find a robust effect of aid on growth. Claims are periodically made for a positive growth 
effect of aid, which later robustness checks fail to replicate. The latest round in this long literature 
is Rajan and Subramanian 2005, which tests virtually all of the earlier positive claims that aid has 
growth effects and finds no supporting evidence.  
A blunt force approach to testing the poverty trap could just ask: do the poorest countries 
have significantly lower per capita growth than the rest, and is their growth zero? We have data 
on per capita income from 1950 to 2001 for 137 countries from a statistical compilation done by 
the economist Angus Maddison (I exclude Communist economies and Persian Gulf oil producers 
as special cases).   We rank countries according to their per capita income in 1950. Did the 
poorest countries remain stuck in poverty over the next half century? The poorest fifth of 
countries in 1950 increased their income over the next five decades by a factor of 2.25 times. The 
other four-fifths of countries increased their incomes by a factor of 2.47 times. The difference in 
growth rates between the two groups is not statistically significant. We can reject that the growth 
rate of the poorest countries as a group was zero. 
To be sure, there were individual poor countries that failed to grow among the poorest 
countries. Chad had zero growth from 1950 to 2001. Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo 
actually had negative per capita growth over this period. However, this is offset by such success 
stories as Botswana, which was the fourth poorest in 1950, but increased its income by a factor of 
13 by 2001. Lesotho was the fifth poorest in 1950, but increased its income by a factor of 5 over 









Testing the poverty trap for long periods  
Per capita growth for:  1950-2001 1950-75 1975-2001 1980-2001  1985-2001
Poorest fifth at beginning of 
period indicated  1.6% 1.9% 0.8% 0.5%* 0.2%*
All others  1.7% 2.5%** 1.1% 0.9%  1.3%**
Reject stationary income for 
poorest fifth  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fail to reject nonstationary 
income for poorest fifth  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*Poorest fifth not statistically distinguishable from zero    
**All others's growth statistically distinguishable from poorest fifth   
Sample: 137 countries. Statistical tests exclude 12 transition economies and Gulf oil states 
 
There are further statistical tests we can do to assess the poverty trap hypothesis. If the 
poverty trap hypothesis holds, then the poorest countries’ log per capita incomes should be 
stationary. Income will fluctuate randomly around this level, but will always tend to return to it. 
There are two ways we can test the hypothesis of stationarity in the panel data on log per capita 
incomes. We can have stationarity as the null hypothesis and see whether the data reject the null  
(the Hadri (2000) test), or we can have non-stationarity as the null hypothesis and see whether the 
data fail to reject non-stationarity (the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2002) test). When we do a test for the 
stationarity of income over the subsequent half century for the poorest fifth of countries in 1950, 
we decisively reject the null hypothesis of stationarity. When we take non-stationarity to be the 
null, the data provide no evidence against that hypothesis.   
Perhaps it was aid that enabled poor countries to have non-stationary income? When I 
break the sample in half into those poor countries that had above average foreign aid and below 
average foreign aid, I find identical results on non-stationarity 1950-2001 in both halves as with 
the above tests. Poor countries without aid had enough positive growth to reject the poverty trap 
hypothesis.   
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Let us keep looking for confirmation of the two main predictions of the poverty trap 
story: (1) that growth of the poorest countries is lower than other countries, and (2) per capita 
growth of the poorest countries is zero. The poorest did have lower growth in an earlier period, 
1950-75, than the others. However, this was not a poverty trap, as average growth of the poorest 
during 1950-75 was still a very healthy 1.9 percent per year (roughly the same as the long-run 
growth rate of the American economy, for example).There is still no evidence of lower growth 
for the poorest countries for recent periods, like 1975-2001 or 1980-2001. The poorest fifth of 
countries at the beginning of those periods had growth performance over the subsequent period 
that was statistically indistinguishable from the other four-fifths of countries. Only when the 
starting point is put in 1985 does there finally appear evidence that the poorest did worse.  
The evidence that Jeffrey Sachs adduces for the poverty trap in his book The End of Poverty 
is from this later period. So over 1985 to the present, it is true that the poorest fifth of countries have 
significantly lower per capita growth than other countries, about 1.1 percentage points lower over. It 
doesn’t help the poverty trap story that 11 out of the 28 poorest countries in 1985 had NOT been in the 
poorest fifth back in 1950. They had gotten into poverty by declining from above, rather than being 
stuck in it from below. Even for this period, we reject the hypothesis that all of the poorest countries 
had stable per capita income for 1985 to the present. 
The later period is when the stylized facts are most consistent with a poverty trap. 
However, the poorest countries were getting more in foreign aid as a percent of their income in 
the last 15 years, compared to the previous periods. Foreign aid is supposed to be helping the 
poor countries escape from the poverty trap; hence the poorest countries in the recent decade 
should have been LESS likely to be stuck in poverty than the previous decades with lower foreign 
aid. In sum, the evidence for an aid-induced Great Escape from poverty is less than 
overwhelming. 
Research by Ricardo Hausmann, Lant Pritchett, and Dani Rodrik in 2004 studied “growth 
accelerations,” episodes over 1950 to 2000 in which per capita growth rose by at least two percentage 
points for at least 8 years. According to the poverty trap hypothesis, we should not expect to see these 
growth accelerations for the poorest countries. However, Hausmann and co-authors found the  
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opposite: growth accelerations were more likely in the poorest quarter of the sample than for any other 
group. As in my findings above, they found the poorest countries did better in earlier than in later 
periods.
14 Out of six sustained growth accelerations from the bottom rung of the sample (the bottom 
20 percent of per capita incomes, with date of acceleration in parentheses)  – Uganda (1989), Congo-
Brazzaville (1969), Indonesia (1967), Thailand (1957),  China (1978), and Pakistan  (1979)– only one 
of them (Uganda) involved an above-average amount of aid at the time of the growth acceleration.  
Divergence Big Time: Poverty Traps or Bad Government? 
  There is a big historical fact that could be consistent with a poverty trap. This is what 
Lant Pritchett called “Divergence Big Time” (Pritchett 1997).  The gap between the richest and 
poorest countries widened drastically over the last two centuries, with the ratio of the max to the 
min going from about 6 to about 70 today. There IS a positive correlation between per capita 
growth from say 1820 to 2001 and the initial level of income in 1820, as shown in the table 
below. Was this because the poor countries were stuck in a poverty trap? Well, first of all, the 
data do not actually fit our definition of a poverty trap – per capita growth of the poorest countries 
is not zero. The predicted level of annual per capita growth 1820-2001 for the poorest country in 
the sample in 1820 (Nepal) has a 95 percent confidence interval {0.80, 1.26}.  African countries 
are not in the sample. However, Maddison gives an estimate for the continent as a whole 
(including North Africa) in 1820 -- per capita growth in Africa from 1820 to 2001 is 0.7 percent 
per annum. 
  However, Divergence Big Time still suggests poor countries are at some growth 
disadvantage – does this reflect low savings and/or increasing returns to capital? The alternative 
explanation is that Europe and its offshoots discovered some combination of democracy and 
capitalism that made possible the industrial revolution. The institutions of democracy and 
capitalism could be correlated with per capita income in 1820 and that could explain why 
countries that were richer in 1820 subsequently grew faster. This would be closely related to the 
“Reversal of Fortune” finding of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002.   This could imply an 
                                                 
14 Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik 2004  
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institutional poverty trap, but not the savings and technology poverty trap favored by the 
traditional development narrative.  
  The table tests this story by using the Polity IV database on democracy since 1820 as a 
proxy for institutional development. I average whatever Polity data is available on each country 
over 1820-2001 (and then over 1870-2001), which implicitly assumes that any periods of missing 
data showed the same democracy on average as those periods for which data is available. This 
assumption is problematic, so I try two variants on this approach. First, I recognize that most 
countries in the sample with missing data were under colonial administration, which is not 
usually considered a very democratic institution. I make the assumption that colonial control 
equates to the lowest democracy rating in Polity IV, and try the corrected variable as a measure of 
democracy. Second, I simply omit any country that does not have at least 75 Polity IV 
observations over 1820-2001 (or 1870-2001). It turns out that all three alternatives give similar 
results: average democracy is significantly correlated with long term growth in most 
specifications, and the coefficient on per capita income declines, turns insignificant, or even turns 
negative once you control for institutions.  
  I do not intend these results as a major empirical statement on the contentious issue of the 
effect of democracy on growth or development. There is a huge literature on institutions and 
economic growth and development.
15 We know from modern data that democracy is highly 
correlated with other measures of good institutions like property rights, contract enforcement, or 
controls on corruption, so it could be proxying for any of these things. I think of this as a simple 
descriptive exercise to compare two alternative hypotheses: (1) Divergence Big Time was due to 
a savings/technology poverty trap or (2) it was due to bad government/institutions. The stylized 
facts emerging from this exercise support (2) strongly over (1), confirming previous literature on 
institutions and development.
                                                 
15 See references and discussion in Acemoglu et al. 2004, Easterly and Levine 2003, and Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2002.   
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OLS Regressions for Divergence Big Time: Growth Per Capita on Initial Income and Democracy 
Average in the Long Run 
  Growth Rate 1820-2001    Growth Rate 1870-2001 
Regression (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Initial 
income  0.00468 0.00335 0.00113 0.00036   0.00181 0.00031 -0.00388 -0.00265
  3.8 2.32 0.84 0.24   1.77 0.21 -1.90 -1.58
Democracy 
average 
Polity IV    0.00037 0.00081     0.00041  0.00110  





for colonies        0.00083        0.00099
       4.7        3.93
Constant  -0.01770 -0.01078 0.00260 0.00785   0.00305 0.01131  0.03804 0.02989
  -2.11 -1.16 0.29 0.83   0.42 1.17  2.81 2.71
# 
observations 52  51 32 51   63 62  39 62
R-squared 0.169  0.258 0.633 0.386   0.040 0.102  0.333 0.208
Restriction    
polity 




  Of course, one big concern about these results is causality. High growth could be causing 
high democracy (or other good institutions) rather than the other way around. I do the usual 
instrumental variables exercise to address this concern. My instruments are conventional from the 
previous literature: distance from the equator, and British, French, German, or socialist legal 
origin. (There are the usual doubts about the exclusion restriction that the instruments don’t 
directly affect growth.) Initial per capita income is never significant once you control for the 
exogenous component of democracy. The results on democratic institutions are weaker in the 
1870-2001 sample once you use IV estimation, but the results for 1820-2001 are fairly strong that 
high quality institutions induce growth.  In sum, controlling for the exogenous component of 
good institutions makes Divergence Big Time go away. This confirms the institutions story of 
Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2004), and contradicts the savings/technology poverty trap story. 
  15
 
IV Regressions for Divergence Big Time: Growth Per Capita on Initial Income and 
Democracy Average in the Long Run 
   Per Capita Growth 1820-2001     Per Capita Growth 1870-2001 
Regressions 1 2 3    4 5 6 
Log initial 
income  0.00269 0.00184 -0.00069   -0.00025 -0.00263  -0.00415




whole period  0.00067 0.00065    0.00062 0.00081   





Colonies     0.00109      0.00135
     3.74      3.13
Constant  -0.00791 -0.00142 0.01374   0.01407 0.03069  0.03860
  -0.77 -0.12 1.13   1.09 1.48  2.34
R-squared 0.304  0.599 0.507   0.128 0.303  0.282




>75      
Polity 
Count 
>75   
Instruments: Distance from equator, British legal origin, French legal origin, socialist legal 
origin, German legal origin 
 
 
I get similar results when I run a horse race between initial income and various measures of 
quality of institutions in the modern data. There was still divergence in 1960-2002 according to the 
following table. This does not contradict the evidence on lack of a poverty trap over 1960-2001 
presented earlier, since the predicted growth rate of the lowest income group in the regression below is 
still significantly above zero. I find both the following statements to be true: (1) we can reject that the 
coefficient of growth 1960-2002 on initial income is zero, and (2) we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the poorest quintile had the same growth as the top four-fifths of the sample and we can reject that the 
poorest quintile’s growth was zero. We could still detect a tendency towards absolute divergence with  
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the help of the middle income and high income observations, even though we cannot detect 
abnormally low growth of the bottom quintile over the last 4 decades. 
I use three widely used measures of institutions: (1) the Polity IV measure again, now 
averaged over 1960-2002), (2) the Freedom House measure of political liberties (with the sign 
reversed, since an increase in this measure means less liberty), averaged over all available years, 
which are 1972-2002, and (3) Economic Freedom in the World from the Fraser Institute, averaged 
over all available years, which are 1970-2002. All measures of institutions are strongly significant 
predictors of growth 1960-2002, and make initial income negative in the regressions (significantly so 




                                                 
16 This result echoes the huge “conditional convergence” literature. I do not intend to address issues in that 
literature; I am just testing whether institutions could account for divergence.  
  17
 
Regressions for divergence in 1960-2002          
Dependent variable: per capita growth averaged over 1960-2002         
 Divergence   
OLS Regressions with 
Institutions   
IV Regressions with 
Institutions 
 1    2  3  4    5  6  7 
Initial income  0.0043   -0.0009 -0.0031 -0.0035   -0.0124  -0.0177 -0.0145
  3.12   -0.43 -1.49 -1.74   -2.13  -2.17 -2.21
Average Polity 
IV Democracy, 
1960-2002     0.0016      0.0048    





2002       0.0045     0.0126  




2002        0.0102      0.0225
         5.69      2.63
Constant  -0.0148   0.0153 0.0552 -0.0136   0.0855  0.1918 0.0007
  -1.4   1.08 2.95 -1.16   2.42  2.48 0.05
Observations 116    109 115 100   91  93 85
R-squared 0.0553    0.1134 0.1739 0.2917        
Instruments:            
Distance from equator, British 
legal origin, French legal 
origin, socialist legal origin, 
German legal origin 
 
I go back to the 1985-2001 period, where there was evidence of differential and zero growth 
in the poorest countries. Let us test in this sample bad government against the poverty trap as a story 
for poor economic growth. The earliest rating we have on corruption is from 1984, from the 
International Country Risk Guide. We have a rating on democracy for the same year from a research 
project at the University of Maryland called Polity IV. Let’s take countries that have the worst ratings 
on both corruption and democracy, and call these countries “bad governments.”  While poor countries 
did worse, it’s also true that the 24 countries with bad governments in 1984 had significantly lower 
growth 1985 to the present: 1.3 percentage points slower than the rest.  There is some overlap between 
these two stories, as poor countries are much more likely to have bad government. So which is it, bad  
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government or the poverty trap? When we control for both initial poverty and bad government, it is 
bad government that explains the slower growth. We cannot statistically discern any effect of initial 
poverty on subsequent growth once we control for bad government. This is still true if we limit the 
definition of bad government to corruption alone. The recent stagnation of the poorest countries 
appears to have more to do with awful government than with a poverty trap, contrary to the Sachs 
hypothesis.  
Testing for takeoffs 
 
  Another staple of Big Push theories is that the Big Push will enable countries to break out 
of the stagnant poverty trap into self-sustained growth. As the Big Push increases the capital 
stock, consumers will rise above subsistence enabling them to save more. The increasing returns 
to capital will be realized, allowing future investment to have attractive returns. This means aid 
will only be needed temporarily, as it can be discontinued once self-sustained growth takes hold. 
Rostow (1960) popularized the term “takeoff” for this transition; he identified specific dates that 
takeoffs had begun in various countries. A similar concept abounds in the latest generation of Big 
Push ideas. Rostow suggested aid could be discontinued after 10-15 years in 1960; Sachs today 
talks about aid being discontinued in 2025. The prediction about growth is that a poor country 
with a successful Big Push will move from a regime of zero per capita growth to a regime of 
stable positive per capita growth.  
  The takeoff concept is independently accepted by some scholars who don’t believe in 
poverty traps and Big Pushes, using alternative models. For example, Parente and Prescott 2000 
have a notion very similar to takeoff in their story of barriers to technology adoption. Likewise 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997 have a takeoff story that depends on risk diversification. Hence, 
testing of takeoffs may be of more general interest than just as part of the classic development 
narrative.  
Also there can be different varieties of takeoffs. The one I am examining is the definition 
I have just given: a country that permanently shifts from per capita growth around zero to stable 
positive per capita growth. I will first use some arbitrary mechanical rules to detect takeoffs, and 
then I will use a more formal statistical procedure.  
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I arbitrarily take per capita growth that lies in the interval [-0.5%,0.5%] to be “zero 
growth”, and define as stable positive per capita growth any subsequent growth that stays above 
1.5 percent per year, measured over suitably long periods. The takeoff definition excludes cases 
in which high positive per capita growth is preceded by negative growth (below -0.5 percent), 
because part of the growth will simply be recovery to a previous level. To capture the idea of a 
sudden takeoff, I also require that the shift be in adjacent periods. This is obviously sensitive to 
the length of the period and the breakpoints for the periods. I try to define long enough periods to 
allow for some time for takeoff to happen, and the breakpoints are given exogenously by the 
years when the Angus Maddison (2003) dataset reports observations for a large # of countries. 
After 1950, Maddison reports annual data through 2001. For rich countries, I used 1960 instead of 
1950 as the last breakpoint because many European countries and Japan had artificially low 
postwar output in 1950.  
The following table shows that only one of today’s rich countries meet this definition of 
“take-off”.  This is the famous Japan take-off during the Meiji era.  
  In all other rich countries, we have gradual acceleration of growth rather than takeoff. 
Growth slowly accelerated from a median value of 0.2 percent in 1600-1820 to 0.8 percent in 
1820-1870, 1.3 percent in 1870-1913, 1.6 percent in 1913-1960, to 2.8 percent in 1960-2001. 
This is not very consistent with a Big Push notion of a sudden switch from stagnation to vigorous 
growth. The medians could smooth out variations in individual countries, but examining the latter 
does not find much in the way of dramatic shifts either. The closest approximations would seem 
to be in the late industrializers Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The latter four did have a 
dramatic acceleration of growth after 1960. However, the growth in these four countries was not 
zero prior to the growth shift, as required by the takeoff hypothesis. Even in Japan, the takeoff 
featured a smooth acceleration of growth rather than a one time movement from zero growth to 
constant positive growth.  
  Is the definition of “zero growth” prior to the takeoff too stringent? A 0.5 percent per 
capita growth rate cumulates to a 28 percent increase in income over 50 years and 65 percent  
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change over 100 years. It seems hard to argue that requiring annual per capita growth be below 
this threshold to be counted as zero growth is overly stringent. Likewise, the requirement that 
growth surpass 1.5 percent to be counted as a takeoff seems like a modest requirement. The 
median growth rate of rich countries 1820 to 2001 is 1.6 percent, with very tight clustering of 
growth rates around this median. This seems like as good a definition as any of a minimum 
“normal” growth rate for a country that has “taken off.” Moreover, the movement from 0.5 to 1.5 
is requiring a permanent change in growth of only 1 percentage point, which seems modest 
compared to the expectations of enthusiasts for the “Big Push.”    
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Take-offs in rich countries (data from Maddison 2003)         





Australia   3.7% 0.9% 1.1%  1.8% 2.1%
Austria 0.2%  0.2% 0.8% 1.4% 1.3%  2.8% 1.6%
Belgium 0.2%  0.1% 1.4% 1.0% 1.1%  2.7% 1.5%
Canada   0.6% 1.3% 2.2% 1.4%  2.3% 1.6%
Denmark 0.2%  0.2% 0.9% 1.6% 1.7%  2.4% 1.8%
Finland 0.2%  0.2% 0.8% 1.4% 2.3%  2.9% 1.6%
France 0.1%  0.2% 1.0% 1.4% 1.6%  2.5% 1.6%
Germany 0.1%  0.1% 1.1% 1.6% 1.6%  2.2% 1.6%
Greece 0.1%  0.2% 0.6% 1.4% 1.4%  3.4% 1.8%
Ireland 0.2%  0.2% 1.4% 1.0% 1.0%  4.1% 1.6%
Italy 0.0%  0.0% 0.6% 1.2% 1.8%  2.9% 1.9%
Japan 0.1%  0.1% 0.2% 1.5% 2.2% 4.0% 1.4%
Netherlands 0.4%  -0.1% 0.8% 0.9% 1.5%  2.4% 1.7%
New Zealand      1.2% 1.4%  1.2%  
Norway 0.2%  0.2% 0.5% 1.3% 2.3%  3.0% 1.5%
Portugal   0.1%  0.1% 0.1% 0.6% 1.8%  3.8% 1.5%
Spain 0.0%  0.1% 0.4% 1.2% 0.9%  4.0% 1.6%
Sweden 0.2%  0.2% 0.7% 1.4% 2.2%  2.1% 1.7%
United 
Kingdom 0.2%  0.3% 1.3% 1.0% 1.2%  2.1% 1.4%
United States  0.7% 1.3% 1.8% 1.5%  2.3% 1.7%
median growth 
of rich 
countries  0.2% 0.2% 0.8% 1.3% 1.6%  2.7% 1.6%
 
  Unfortunately, the patterns of growth in developing countries in the long run are even 
less supportive of the “take-off” concept. As Pritchett (2000) pointed out, the shape of various 
developing countries log per capita income paths vary as “hills, plateaus, mountains, and plains” 
in which there are unpredictable sequences of zero, positive, and negative growth. Easterly, 
Kremer, Pritchett, and Summers (1993) pointed out the instability of growth, with a very low 
correlation between who is growing in one period (measured as a decade, 15 years, 20 years, etc.) 
and who is growing in the following period. If takeoffs dominated the data then we would expect 
a stronger cross-period correlation as most countries would be in stable zero growth or positive 
growth regimes, with only a few switchovers for those who began takeoffs in between the two 
periods.  
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  The following table shows data since 1820 for all developing regions from Maddison 
(2003). Since developing countries were not so directly affected by World War II, I use 1950 as a 
breakpoint (the breakpoints are again determined when data is available in Maddison for years 
prior to 1950). I take advantage of the longer post-war period to split it into two periods divided 
by 1975. It seems desirable to look at finer recent intervals for developing countries because the 
takeoffs would presumably be more recent. I first examine data on developing country regions: 
Looking for take-offs in developing country regions 







Africa   0.3% 0.6% 0.9%  1.8% 0.2%
Caribbean countries (24)   -0.3% 1.8% 1.4%  3.2% 1.0%
East Asian countries (16 )  -0.1% 0.5% -0.1%  3.5% 3.4%
East European Countries (7)  0.6% 1.4% 0.6%  3.7% 0.4%
Latin America   0.0% 1.8% 1.4%  2.5% 0.8%
West Asian countries (15)   0.4% 0.9% 1.3%  4.4% 0.2%
 
Only the East Asia region meets the definition of takeoff proposed above, since all the other 
regions had growth dip below 1.5 percent in the period 1975-2001. Apparently growth was not so 
“self-sustaining.” Latin America and the Caribbean also had already had an earlier proto-takeoff 
period in 1870-1913, but failed to sustain it.  
  Looking at individual countries, Maddison has 44 developing countries with data 
available at least as early as 1913. Five out of the 44 meet the definition of takeoff, using the 
same periodization as above. The takeoffs (indicated with *, with periods of takeoff shown in 
bold) are all well-known examples of success. The other 39 countries fail to meet the criteria of 
takeoff of going from zero growth (between -0.5 percent and 0.5 percent) to sustained positive 
growth (above 1.5 percent). The others did not meet the definition either because growth did not 
stay above 1.5 percent after “take-off” (the most common reason), or because growth was above 
0.5 percent in prior to the takeoff. Alas any mechanical rule will inevitably be arbitrary, but the 
virtue of a mechanical rule is that one is not subjectively fiddling with the data.   
I settled on this rule a priori and did not experiment with alternative rules.  I will however 
do one robustness check – suppose that we allow pre-takeoff growth to be between -1 and +1  
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percent, and still I require post-takeoff growth to permanently increase by 1 percentage point (so 
now it must be above 2 percent). This adds 4 new takeoffs which will meet many observers’ 
priors as having had a takeoff – China, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Vietnam (shown with ** in the 
table). However, three of the five original takeoffs no longer qualify – Hong Kong, India, and 
Singapore all have intermediate way-stations of 1.5 percent growth, showing gradual acceleration 
of growth rather than takeoff according to the new criteria. So according to the new rules, there 
are six takeoffs in the data out of 44 countries. 
The other striking thing about these takeoffs is that they are all happening in a 
geographically concentrated region, amongst countries that have traditional ties with each other. 
This seems to make them less than fully independent observations, and raises the question of 
what could account for the spatial concentration. 
















Albania     1.4% 0.6% 3.3% 0.8%   
Algeria   1.0%  1.1% 0.4% 2.5% 0.4%   
Argentina     2.5% 0.7% 2.0% 0.0%   
Brazil   0.2%  0.3% 2.0% 3.7% 1.1%   
Bulgaria     1.4% 0.2% 5.0% -0.1%   
Burma   0.0%  0.7% -1.5% 2.1% 2.9%   
Chile     2.4% 1.0% 0.5% 3.2%   
China   -0.2%  0.1% -0.6% 2.8% 5.4%  ** 
Colombia     1.8% 1.5% 2.1% 1.3%   
Czechoslovakia   0.6%  1.4% 1.4% 3.0% 0.7%   
Egypt   0.6%  0.8% 0.0% 1.8% 2.9%   
Ghana   1.3% 1.0% 0.4% 0.2%   
Hong Kong  0.2%  1.5% 1.5% 4.6% 4.3%  * 
Hungary     1.5% 0.5% 3.4% 1.0%   
India   0.0%  0.5% -0.2% 1.5% 3.0%  * 
Indonesia   0.1%  0.8% -0.2% 2.3% 3.0%  ** 
Iran 0.4%  0.8% 1.5% 4.9% -0.7%   
Iraq   0.4%  0.8% 0.8% 4.6% -4.6%   
Jamaica   -0.5%  0.3% 2.1% 4.3% -0.2%   
Jordan   0.4%  0.8% 1.4% 1.8% 1.7%   
Lebanon   0.5%  1.1% 1.6% 1.4% 0.0%   
Malaysia   0.2%  0.7% 1.5% 2.1% 4.1%   
Mexico   -0.2%  2.2% 0.8% 3.1% 1.2%   
Morocco   0.5%  0.5% 1.9% 0.9% 1.6%   
Nepal   0.0%  0.7% -0.2% 1.0% 1.8%   
North Korea   0.0%  0.7% -0.2% 5.2% -3.5%   
Peru     1.8% 2.1% 2.5% -0.6%   
Philippines 0.2%  0.7% 0.0% 2.6% 0.7%   
Poland     1.4% 0.9% 3.5% 1.0%   
Romania     1.5% -1.0% 4.6% -0.7%   
Singapore   0.2%  1.5% 1.5% 4.3% 4.6%  * 
South Africa   1.5%  1.5% 1.2% 2.1% -0.1%   
South Korea   0.0%  0.7% -0.2% 5.7% 5.9%  * 
Sri Lanka  1.1%  0.9% 0.0% 0.8% 3.2%   
Syria   0.5%  1.1% 1.6% 3.4% 1.2%   
Taiwan 0.2%  0.7% 0.6% 5.8% 5.4%  ** 
Thailand   0.2%  0.4% -0.1% 3.5% 4.5%  * 
Tunisia   0.8%  0.8% 0.6% 3.1% 2.5%   
Turkey   0.5%  0.9% 0.8% 3.5% 1.7%   
Uruguay   1.0% 0.9% 0.6% 1.3%   
USSR   0.6%  1.1% 1.7% 3.1% -1.1%    
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Venezuela   1.5% 5.2% 1.4% -0.8%   
Vietnam -0.1%  0.8% -0.3% 0.3% 3.7%  ** 
Yugoslavia     1.3% 1.0% 4.5% -0.4%   
Notes to table: data are all from Maddison 2003. All growth rates are for dates shown except for 1870-1913 
for Chile, Colombia, and Peru, where the growth rates shown are for 1900-1913 – the earliest data available 
from Maddison   
 
In sum, the episode analysis here examined the experience of 127 countries and found 9 
takeoffs (according to two different definitions that are not consistent). To put it another way, the 
contemporary and historical exercises for poor and rich countries together included 71 countries 
that passed from an income of below $2000 (my arbitrary breakpoint for low income) to an 
income above $2000 over some period. Excluding one takeoffs that is still below $2000 as of 
2001 (India), 8 out of 71 countries emerging out of low income status did so by means of a 
takeoff according to one definition or the other. This is not a very strong case for the hypothesis 
that development usually happens through takeoffs.
17 
How do these takeoffs relate to foreign aid? I examine the 8 takeoffs that happened 
around 1950-75 according to either definition, and collect aid statistics for 1960-75. Aid data on 
the 1950s is not generally available. I was aware that there had been large US aid programs in the 
1950s in South Korea and Taiwan, so further exploration tracked down a source of US aid to 
these two countries from 1953 on, which is reflected in the numbers below.
18   The median aid to 
GDP ratio in the whole developing country sample for this period is 2.8 percent of GDP. Three of 
the eight takeoffs are above this: Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan. Hence, we could describe 
these three cases as fitting the pattern of an aid-financed takeoff, with Korea as the strongest 
case.
19 Of course, this does not necessarily give evidence that aid is associated with takeoffs, as 
                                                 
17 Pritchett (2000) did not explicitly set out to test for takeoffs, but he did look for structural breaks in 
growth rates in a way similar to what I am doing. Using PWT 5.6 data for 111 countries, he found 7 cases 
he called “Denver” (where the plains meet the Rocky Mountains), which are closely analogous to 
“takeoffs”. His methodology was to look for cases where growth was below 1.5 percent prior to a structural 
break and then above 1.5 percent after the break. The 7 cases were India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Chile, 
Uruguay, Ghana, and Mauritius. The different sample period and methodology explain different country 
selections, but the general result that few countries fit the pattern of “take-offs” is robust across my study 
and his. 
18 Jacoby 1966 
19However, Fox 1999 reviews the case study evidence on foreign aid and Korea, and questions the role of 
aid in Korea’s rapid growth (which began after US aid declined). Fox summarizes the studies as follows 
“foreign aid contributed only slightly to the Korean miracle and that rapid growth was due primarily to a 
combination of domestic factors and a favorable international environment.”  
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there were other countries that got high aid and did NOT have a takeoff. A probit regression for 
the probability of takeoff as a function of aid to GNI over 1960-75 has an insignificant negative 
coefficient on aid.  
Takeoffs and aid, 1960-75 
Country Name 
Foreign aid as a percent 
of Gross National 
Income, 1960-75 
except where noted 
China #N/A
Hong Kong  0.11
India 1.82
Indonesia 3.93
Korea, Rep./1  8.39
Singapore 0.46
Taiwan, China/1  3.75
Thailand 0.90
Median  for whole sample  2.78
/1 Data refer to average 1953-75 
 
 
The other sign of a takeoff is supposed to be a large increase in investment as a share of 
GDP. Unfortunately, we do not have data giving investment before 1950, so this prediction is 
impossible to test directly. I am limited to examining the post take-off investment in the two 
periods 1950-75 and 1976-2000, as shown in the following table, compared to the rest of the 
cross-country sample. I list all countries that met either criteria for takeoff. Investment to GDP 
ratios are undistinguished in China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan in 1950-75. They 
are exceptional in Singapore and Hong Kong, and to a lesser degree in Thailand. If we do a probit 
regression for who has a takeoff (according to either criteria or both), investment in 1950-75 is 
not a significant predictor of these takeoffs. Investment in 1975-2000 is considerably more 
exceptional in the takeoff countries, but this may be reverse causality, since this is long after the 
takeoff started in these countries. 
Investment to GDP ratios in Takeoff Countries 
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  Percent of GDP 
Percentile ranking in the 
worldwide sample 
  1950-75 1975-2000  1950-75 1975-2000 
China** 12.8  20.8 38% 77%
Hong Kong*  30.8  25.2 86% 93%
India* 11.0  12.2 31% 43%
Indonesia** 9.2  17.7 26% 66%
Singapore* 43.0  42.4 100% 100%
South Korea*  19.0  36.0 59% 99%
Taiwan** 14.0  19.9 46% 76%
Thailand* 23.6  33.4 71% 98%
Vietnam**   10.2   34%
*Takeoff according to first definition 
**Takeoff according to second definition 
Source for Investment/GDP ratios: Penn World Tables Version 6.1 
 
Structural breaks and takeoffs 
  All my exercises thus far suffer from possible arbitrariness as to what and when is a 
takeoff. As a robustness check, I also apply a more formal definition of takeoff to the annual time 
series in Maddison since 1870. The number of years available is variable; all countries in this 
sample have observations at least for 1950-2001, and a smaller sample have annual data for 
longer periods. The sample with pre-1950 observations is smaller than in my previous use of this 
data, because many countries have benchmark observations such as 1870, 1913, and 1950, but 
don’t have annual data in between. On the other hand, I am now including countries that only 
have data since 1950, which I did not include in the episode analysis above, so this makes the 
sample bigger. The net effect is that I have a slightly bigger sample of 139 countries. 
 I use the Bai and Perron (1996, 2003) method of looking for structural breaks in time 
series, in this case the log of per capita income. This method endogenously determines the 
number of structural breaks in the trend of log income, and the dates of those breaks. The dates of 
the breaks are chosen to maximize the fit to the data, and the number of breaks is chosen when 
the improvement in fit from adding another break is sufficiently strong.  For the minimum length 
of a regime segment as a fraction of the sample period, the paper uses .25 for countries with only 
post World War II data and .2 for longer time series (imposing a maximum of 2 breaks in the 
former and 3 breaks in the latter). Experimenting with a larger number of maximum breaks did  
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not give different results. The procedure also calculates the statistical significance of the trend in 
each sub-period.  
  My definition of a takeoff using this procedure is straightforward: any country that has a 
continuous sequence of regimes of zero growth followed by a continuous sequence of regimes of 
positive growth is called a takeoff. The appendix lists the results for 139 countries. Although the 
takeoff hypothesis suggests only one break, the procedure found 2 or more breaks in 109 
countries; none of the 30 countries with one break met the takeoff definition.  I first define zero 
and positive growth by estimated magnitudes as before: zero means lying in the interval [-.005, 
.005] while positive means lying above .015. With this definition, there is only one takeoff in the 
data! It is Costa Rica (1945).  Of the previous takeoffs, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, 
and Thailand did not have a continuous historical annual series when the takeoffs previously 
shown took place. India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan do have a continuous historical series, 
but the growth in the earliest periods is too high for the zero growth definition.  
I next try an alternative definition of zero and positive growth based on statistical 
significance. I define zero growth simply as growth that is not significantly different than zero, 
while positive growth is growth that is significantly above zero. With this statistical definition, 
Costa Rica again shows up as a takeoff, and Bolivia, Brazil, and Cape Verde are added:  
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Takeoffs using Bai-Perron structural breaks method   
Country  Bolivia   Brazil  
Cape 
Verde   Costa Rica 
number of observations  57 132 52 82 
number of breaks  2 3 2 3 
date of first break  1957 1915 1962 1945 
date of second break  1980 1941 1978 1964 
date of third break    1970   1980 
growth rate  regime 1  -0.0005 0.0011 0.0142 0.0021 
regime 2  0.0204 0.0154 -0.0053 0.0248 
regime  3  0.0097 0.0292 0.0304 0.0288 
regime 4   0.0104   0.0203 
takeoff year  1957 1915 1978 1945 
        
significantly different than zero at 5 percent levels shown in bold 
insignificant shown in italics      
 
Bolivia, Brazil, and Cape Verde all failed to pass the previous criteria because either they had 
growth above 0.5 percent prior to takeoff or growth below 1.5 percent after takeoff. The emphasis 
on statistical significance rather than magnitude here gives different results.  
This confusing picture of different takeoff countries for different methods shows mainly 
that the takeoff is so elusive in the data that it is hard to find countries that robustly show takeoffs 
according to what seem like simple, common-sense criteria. (Different data needs for different 
methods and uneven data availability also complicate the picture.) What IS robust across all 
methods for defining takeoffs is that takeoffs are uncommon in the data.  
Conclusions 
  The classic narrative -- poor countries caught in poverty traps, out of which they need a 
Big Push involving increased aid and investment, leading to a takeoff in per capita income -- has 
been very influential in development economics. This was the original justification for foreign 
aid. The narrative became less popular during the market-oriented 80s and 90s (even then the idea 
of the “takeoff” remained widely accepted, as it still is), but has made a big comeback in the new 
millennium. Once again it is invoked as a rationale for large foreign aid programs.   
  30
  This paper applied very simple tests to the various elements of the narrative. Evidence to 
support the narrative is scarce. Poverty traps in the sense of zero growth for low income countries 
are rejected by the data in most time periods. There is evidence of divergence between rich and 
poor nations in the long run, but this does not imply zero growth for the poor countries.  
  The idea of the takeoff does not garner much support in the data. Takeoffs are rare in the 
data, most plausibly limited to the Asian success stories. Even then, the takeoffs do not seem 
strongly associated with aid or investment in the way the standard Big Push narrative would 
imply.  
  Coordination failures and poverty traps are fascinating objects for theoretical and 
empirical exploration. However, the description of poverty traps, Big Pushes, and takeoffs as a 
justification for foreign aid receives scarce support in the actual experiences of economic 
development. The paper instead finds support for democratic institutions and economic freedom 
as determinants of growth that explain the occasions under which poor countries grow more 
slowly than rich countries. The institutional findings are not explored exhaustively in this paper 
(since the area has been so well covered in the literature already). However, the stylized facts 
presented in this paper are more consistent with a story of development in which development 
happens when many agents have the institutional environment that allows and motivates them to 
take small steps from the bottom, as opposed to development happening from a Big Push planner 
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Appendix: Bai-Perron Method for Estimating Structural Breaks, Results for 139 countries 
     
selected by the sequential 
procedure suggested by Bai-
Perron at 5% significance 
coefficients in italics are not 


























Afghanistan 52  2 1969  1986     0.0039  0.0138 -0.0183     
Albania   52  1  1971        0.0354  0.0005       
Algeria   52  1  1976        0.0242  -0.0095       
Angola  52  1  1973        0.0254  -0.0127       
Argentina   102  2  1929  1967     0.0100  0.0151  0.0023    
Australia   132  2  1928  1966     0.0059  0.0204  0.0185    
Austria   132  2  1912  1953     0.0148  0.0071  0.0293    
Bahrain   52  2  1969  1987     0.0269  0.0024  0.0177    
Bangladesh  52  2  1970  1987     0.0076  0.0099  0.0318    
Belgium   132  2  1939  1970     0.0085  0.0327  0.0189    
Benin   52  2  1962  1978     -0.0088  -0.0004  0.0041    
Bolivia   57  2  1957  1980     -0.0005  0.0204 0.0097     
Botswana  52  2  1970  1987     0.0291  0.0623  0.0303    
Brazil    132  3  1915 1941 1970  0.0011  0.0154 0.0292 0.0104 
Bulgaria   52  2  1962  1975     0.0520  0.0391  -0.0112    
Burkina Faso  52  1  1971        0.0198  0.0114       
Burma   52  2  1964  1986     0.0297  0.0250  0.0504    
Burundi  52  2  1968  1987     0.0084  0.0163  -0.0238    
Cambodia   52  2  1968  1985     0.0229  0.0290  0.0131    
Cameroon   52  2  1974  1987     0.0172  0.0403  -0.0075    
Canada  132 2 1918  1971     0.0227  0.0246  0.0150    




52  1  1961        0.0160  -0.0106       
Chad   52  2  1962  1977     0.0155  -0.0062  0.0100    
Chile   102  1  1980        0.0128  0.0434       
China   52  1  1976        0.0209  0.0578       
Colombia   102  2  1925  1970     0.0103  0.0171  0.0154    
Comoro 
Islands   52 2  1973  1986      0.0299  0.0005  -0.0144     
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Congo  52  2  1966  1979     0.0146  0.0188  -0.0161    
Costa  Rica  82  3  1945 1964 1980  0.0021  0.0248 0.0288 0.0203 
Côte d'Ivoire  52  2  1961  1981     0.0202  0.0163  -0.0208    
Cuba  73  3  1943 1971 1986  0.0228  -0.0002  0.0224  -0.0178 
Czecho- 
slovakia   54  2  1970  1987     0.0324  0.0115  0.0080    
Denmark   132  2  1894  1957     0.0121  0.0153  0.0218    
Djibouti  52  2  1968  1982     0.0081  -0.0256  -0.0335    
Dominican 
Republic   52  2  1970  1983     0.0163  0.0208  0.0285    
Ecuador   63  2  1956  1976     0.0313  0.0284  -0.0023    
Egypt   52  1  1975        0.0204  0.0161       
El  Salvador  82  3  1945 1962 1979  0.0071  0.0162  0.0145  0.0159 
Equitorial 
Guinea   52  2  1962  1987     0.0411  0.0093  0.1719    
Eritrea and 
Ethiopia   52  1  1970        0.0225  -0.0026       
Finland    132  3  1915 1942 1968  0.0139  0.0320  0.0371  0.0213 
France  132  3  1922 1948 1974  0.0109  -0.0091  0.0394  0.0155 
Gabon  52  2  1963  1976     0.0337  0.0743  -0.0215    
Gambia   52  2  1964  1981     0.0203  0.0109  0.0034    
Germany   132  2  1912  1954     0.0153  0.0116  0.0231    
Ghana  52  2  1963  1980     0.0185  -0.0119  0.0160    
Greece   81  2  1940  1970     0.0148  0.0548  0.0152    
Guatemala  82  3  1941 1961 1980  0.0338  0.0126  0.0225  0.0069 
Guinea   52  2  1961  1979     0.0267  0.0186  0.0039    
Guinea 
Bissau   52  2  1969        0.0544  -0.0083       
Haïti 57  2  1962  1978      -0.0016  0.0179 -0.0247     
Honduras 82  2  1944  1975      -0.0115  0.0091  0.0025    
Hong Kong  52  2  1961  1986     0.0373  0.0550  0.0178    
Hungary   56  2  1965  1986     0.0401  0.0132  0.0069    
India    118  3  1907 1944 1974  0.0070  -0.0001  0.0137 0.0308 
Indonesia   53  1  1968        0.0083  0.0340       
Iran 52  2  1961  1977      0.0306  0.0698  0.0051    
Iraq   52  1  1977        0.0384  -0.0963       
Ireland    81  3  1939 1955 1984  0.0110  0.0200  0.0330  0.0600 
Israel   52  1  1970        0.0528  0.0189        
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Italy   132  2  1905  1954     0.0067  0.0080  0.0289    
Jamaica   52  2  1963  1974     0.0649  0.0319  0.0054    
Japan   132  1  1959        0.0158  0.0365       
Jordan   52  2  1965  1978     0.0444  0.0258  -0.0092    
Kenya 52  2  1967  1986      0.0097  0.0066  -0.0034    
Kuwait   52  1  1979        -0.0213  0.0149       
Laos  52  2  1974  1987     0.0097  0.0116  0.0229    
Lebanon   52  2  1972  1985     0.0108  -0.0127  0.0462    
Lesotho  52  1  1981        0.0341  0.0381       
Liberia  52  2  1973  1987     0.0150  -0.0283  -0.0168    
Libya   52  2  1963  1982     0.1257  -0.0289  -0.0371    
Madagascar  52  2  1971  1987     0.0095  -0.0289  -0.0085    
Malawi 52  2  1970  1986      0.0161  0.0033  0.0190    
Malaysia   55  1  1962        0.0146  0.0437       
Mali  52  0                      
Mauritania   52  2  1963  1982     0.0353  0.0021  0.0061    
Mauritius   52  2  1966  1979     0.0202  0.0494  0.0475    
Mexico   102  3           0.0098  0.0238  0.0317  0.0052 
Mongolia   52  2  1974  1987     0.0296  0.0357  -0.0139    
Morocco   52  2  1973  1987     0.0064  0.0210  0.0047    
Mozambique  52  2  1974  1987     0.0175  -0.0269  0.0297    
Namibia   52  1  1962        0.0235  0.0012       
Nepal   52  2  1961  1978     0.0187  0.0029  0.0241    
Netherlands    132 2 1939  1968     0.0098  0.0417  0.0176    
New Zealand   132  3  1901  1935  1974  0.0047  -0.0006  0.0196 0.0108 
Nicaragua 82  2  1934  1977      0.0041  0.0265 -0.0220     
Niger  52  2  1961  1982     0.0160  -0.0183  -0.0134    
Nigeria 52  2  1968  1981      0.0059  0.0006  0.0055    
North Korea   52  2  1969  1983     0.0405  0.0059  -0.0753    
Norway    132  3  1898 1924 1950  0.0088  0.0170  0.0195  0.0310 
Oman 52  2  1966  1982      0.0441  0.0236  0.0072    
Pakistan  52  2  1961  1983     0.0073  0.0268  0.0202    
Palestine and 
Gaza   52  0                      
Panama  57  2  1959  1986     0.0072  0.0281  0.0223     
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Paraguay  63  2  1954  1976     -0.0138  0.0185  0.0030    
Peru   102  1  1980        0.0222  -0.0029       
Philippines  56  2  1958  1982     0.0521  0.0234  0.0093    
Poland   52  2  1964  1979     0.0290  0.0330  0.0121    
Portugal   132  2  1942  1968     0.0086  0.0396  0.0285    
Puerto Rico   52  2  1973  1986     0.0546  0.0191  0.0295    
Qatar  52  1  1981        -0.0014  -0.0249       
Reunion   52  1  1965        0.0210  0.0110       
Romania   52  1  1977        0.0448  -0.0195       
Rwanda 52  2  1962  1978      0.0126  0.0305  -0.0186    
São Tomé 
and Principe   52  2  1961  1979     0.0112  0.0282  -0.0131    
Saudi Arabia   52  1  1981        0.0638  -0.0095       
Senegal   52  1  1967        0.0098  -0.0011       
Seychelles  52  1  1969        0.0124  0.0265       
Sierra Leone  52  2  1967  1987     0.0224  -0.0028  -0.1004    
Singapore   52  2  1967  1980     0.0189  0.0683  0.0468    
Somalia   52  1  1962        0.0185  -0.0092       
South Africa   52  1  1972        0.0231  -0.0038       
South Korea   91  2  1943  1969     0.0159  0.0416  0.0620    
Spain   132  2  1935  1962     0.0090  0.0269  0.0298    
Sri  Lanka  132  3  1907 1942 1971  0.0145  0.0027  0.0092  0.0324 
Sudan   52  2  1961  1983     0.0201  0.0016  0.0133    
Swaziland  52  1  1972        0.0551  0.0011       
Sweden   132  2  1915  1968     0.0139  0.0295  0.0138    
Switzerand    132  3  1911 1945 1973  0.0182  0.0178  0.0289  0.0089 
Syria   52  2  1972  1985     0.0163  0.0145  0.0254    
Taiwan  90  2  1942  1969     0.0175  0.0516  0.0538    
Tanzania   52  2  1964  1979     0.0057  0.0088  -0.0035    
Thailand   52  2  1961  1987     0.0241  0.0429  0.0313    
Togo  52  1  1971        0.0355  -0.0247       
Trinidad and 
Tobago   52  2  1961  1983     0.0538  0.0307  0.0223    
Tunisia   52  2  1970  1984     0.0261  0.0279  0.0291    
Turkey   79  2  1939  1970     0.0466  0.0293  0.0222     
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Uganda   52  2  1964  1977     0.0100  -0.0105  0.0137    
United Arab 
Emirates   52 2  1963  1981      0.0321  -0.0040 0.0048    
United 
Kingdom   132 2 1918  1944     0.0101  0.0210  0.0205    
United States   132  2  1899  1939     0.0161  0.0086  0.0197    
Uruguay  132  2           0.0078  0.0031  0.0148    
USSR   56  2  1967  1985     0.0390  0.0157  -0.0387    
Venezuela  102  3           0.0191  0.0464  0.0081  -0.0024 
Vietnam  52  2  1965  1982     0.0188  0.0068  0.0471    
Yemen   52  2  1971  1984     0.0149  0.0315  0.0087    
Yugoslavia   55  1  1981        0.0460  -0.0332       
Zaire  52  2  1971  1984     0.0091  -0.0315  -0.0794    
Zambia   52  2  1963  1976     0.0274  -0.0053  -0.0157    
Zimbabwe  52  1  1968        0.0199  -0.0015       
 